Recent experiments with the Dictator Game (and the ensuing discussions) have been affected by considerable confusion regarding the purpose of this design. A common complaint is that the design gives rise to fragile regularities and therefore is of little use for theory-testing. We take issue with this view, and instead argue that the Dictator Game is potentially a very useful tool for experimental game theory, if properly used. It is particularly useful for investigating social norms, but economists have failed to take advantage of the Dictator Game because they still lack an adequate theory of norms.
Introduction
In the Postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1971) , Thomas Kuhn highlights the role played by "exemplars" in defining and driving research within a scientific paradigm. Exemplars are paradigmatic examples of how "good science" ought to be done, and can take various forms: a theoretical model, a mathematical proof, a methodological device, an experimental set-up can all be "exemplars" in Kuhn's sense. A paradigmatic experiment, as the term will be used in this paper, is an exemplary experimental design in Kuhn's sense. Paradigmatic experiments are important at least for three reasons * We thank participants to the Behavioral Economics workshop in Trento for their comments and suggestions.
The usual disclaimers apply. Guala's work was supported by a research grant of the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, University of Trento. (Guala 2008) : they have (1) a pedagogic function, by showing students how a good experiment is to be designed and run; (2) a reference function, by generating robust regularities from which new effects can be detected once some details of the experimental design have been varied; and (3) a sociological function, by setting standards that differentiate practice in one discipline from what is done in neighboring fields.
Studying paradigmatic experiments is thus particularly instructive, for what they can tell us about the research ethos and epistemic commitments of a scientific community. Experimental economics is no exception from this respect. Among widely replicated experiments in this field, the Double Oral Auction, Public Goods, and Ultimatum games are perhaps best known to economists and social scientists in general. Over the last decade, however, a new designknown as the "Dictator Game" (DG) -has attracted considerable attention. The DG is probably the simplest experimental setting one can think of. Indeed, the interaction between players in a DG is so minimal that one wonders whether the term "game" is appropriate at all: two players are to divide a sum of money provided by the experimenter (say, 10 euros, for simplicity). Only one player, however, can determine the size of the shares -she is the "dictator", and the other player can only accept the proposed division.
The DG is often presented as the latest addition to an already long list of "anomalous" games in the experimental literature (cf. Camerer and Thaler 1995) . According to standard economic theory -based on the assumptions of rationality and self-interest -a dictator should keep 100% of the cake, and give nothing to the other player. As we shall see, this is not what happens in the laboratory, when subjects play the DG for real money. The rationality assumption is hardly questionable in a simple setting such as the DG: in the absence of major disturbances, it would be perverse to suggest that players do not understand the logic of this game. This leaves the selfishness hypothesis as the weak link in the standard economic model. Thus, unsurprisingly, much of the debate has focused on what the DG can teach us about human preferences and motives.
Altruism, fairness, and robustness
In a "standard" DG, only 40% of the experimental subjects playing the role of dictator keep the whole sum allocated by the experimenter. The majority of individuals prefer to give something to the other player, and the amounts offered (including zero-offers) average at about 20% of the cake (Forsythe et al. 1994) . These results seem to contradict the selfishness assumption, and are usually read as evidence of the importance of other-regarding preferences in economic behavior.
1 Two such preferences stand out as potentially relevant for the DG: dictators may be willing to give up part of their gains because they care about others'
welfare, but also out of a concern for the equality of the resulting allocation. To distinguish, we shall label them the altruism and fairness hypotheses, respectively.
Under this interpretation, the DG may be a useful device to elicit and measure altruistic and fair preferences. That fairness and altruism are real phenomena is rather uncontroversial.
Volunteering and donating to charities, for example, are important aspects of the non-profit sectors of all advanced economies, helping to solve market failures of various kinds and fulfilling other important social functions. What is controversial, or at least poorly understood, is the extent to which such fairness and altruism motives counteract selfish ones, and the conditions under which non-standard preferences may become important for predictive and policy purposes. The importance of the DG for experimental economics and economic theory would depend accordingly on the relative magnitude and robustness of the phenomenon that has been observed. As a consequence, much recent work has been concerned with testing the robustness of other-regarding preferences to changes in the details of the experimental design. This is a standard procedure across all the sciences, and should not be dismissed merely as a dogged attempt by dogmatic economists to get rid of an unwelcome result. By varying the initial conditions of a design, one can explore the range of circumstances in which a phenomenon can be observed, and better assess its importance for theoretical, practical, and engineering purposes.
Robustness testing is at the origins of some of the seminal and celebrated results of experimental economics. The convergence to efficient equilibria of markets with double oral auctions was demonstrated by Vernon Smith (1962) while testing the robustness of classroom experiments conducted by Edward Chamberlin at Harvard in the 1940s. Chamberlin (1948) observed that experimental buyers and sellers fail to discover the price of market clearing, and interpreted this result as a confirmation of his own theory of monopolistic competition.
1 "Economic behavior" from now on is to be taken broadly as any kind of behavior having to do with the allocation of scarce resources, rather than narrowly as human behavior in the context of competitive markets.
The broad definition is by far the most entrenched in both neoclassical and heterodox traditions. It is worth keeping this in mind when assessing current experiments on the DG. Like Smith's seminal experiments, some of the recent literature seems to be driven by the desire to "give the standard theory a better shot". In a widely cited experiment, Hoffman et al (1996) report a significant decrease of donations in the DG. The decrease is obtained by imposing strict anonymity ("double-blind") 2 conditions and by decreasing the "social distance" between subjects and experimenter, as well as among the subjects themselves. In this environment, 60% of dictators decide to keep the whole amount for themselves, and the proportion of subjects donating more than thirty percent of the cake decreases from about 40 to less than 10% of the sample.
But DG behavior can be pushed even closer to the prediction of standard theory. Cherry et al. (2002) have observed that 95% of subjects donate nothing when a "legitimacy" factor is added to double-blind anonymity. Legitimacy over the assets to be shared is induced by 2 In most economic experiments subjects do not know each other's identity but, potentially at least, their identity is known to experimenters ("single blind" design). When appropriate procedures are put in place to preserve anonymity also to experimenters, economists speak of a "double blind" design.
making the dictators earn money by answering the questions of a GMAT 3 quiz. In an inexact science like economics, a 5% deviation from theoretical predictions is an impressive result indeed.
Other studies however suggest that DG behavior can be pushed in the opposite direction too. Mittone and Ploner (2008) use an environment that is identical to the Cherry et al. (2002) design, except that the recipients are asked to exert the same effort as the dictators (by answering a quiz) while not being rewarded by the experimenter (i.e. the recipients' effort does not contribute to the size of the cake to be shared). In this case, "asset legitimacy" has a much weaker impact on the level of donations, because it is counter-balanced by equity of effort considerations. Up to 80% of dictators now are willing to give something, and the average level of donations is tripled compared to the treatment with asymmetric effort.
A similar phenomenon had already been highlighted by Ruffle (1998) , who observed the effect of asymmetric effort in a game where only recipients were asked to contribute to the size of the cake by answering a quiz. In a significant number of cases (about 20% of the time)
dictators went so far as to offer more than half of the sum that recipients had earned. This effect was absent in the baseline condition where the recipient's earnings were determined by a random device. As expected, exerting effort increased the average level of donations too.
Other studies report an increase in donations when the recipient is identified with a "reputable charity" like the Red Cross, compared to an anonymous subject. Even in a doubleblind environment, the Red Cross attracted donations from over 73% of the dictators, as opposed to only 27% in the anonymous recipients condition (Eckel and Grossman 1996) . The average level of contributions was tripled. Brañas Garza (2006) similarly observed that recipients from poor countries attract higher levels of donation than anonymous individuals drawn from the same pool of subjects as dictators, and that specifying the way in which money is going to be spent (e.g. to purchase medicines) further enhances this effect.
We have gone to some length in surveying this literature, mainly to highlight the diversity of results obtained with the DG. This diversity is not unique to the DG -anthropologists for example have found quite a lot of variation across different cultures in the results of Ultimatum and Public Goods experiments (Henrich et al. 2004 ). But it is quite striking that so different results were observed in similar pools of subjects, in countries with similar social structures. As a consequence, it is not uncommon nowadays to hear or read complaints about the intrinsic instability of the DG. The implication is that instability implies unreliability, and hence that one should better abandon the DG as a research tool.
In the rest of this paper we want to put this implication under scrutiny, and try to disentangle the considerable confusion that surrounds current research on the DG. The purpose is not to challenge the conclusion that the DG is a poor experimental environment -it may indeed be the case, and anyway only time will tell whether important insights can be gained with this experimental design or not. Rather, we want to argue that learning from the DG is possible only conditional on a radical reorientation of economists' research goals and focus. We will claim the DG can be an interesting device for the student of social norms, and therefore can be useful to economists to the extent that social norms influence economic behavior both within and outside markets.
But we are running too far ahead here. First of all, it will be necessary to identify some of the reasons that cause economists to be suspicious about the DG. Economics has always been a distinctively theory-driven scientific discipline. Although experimental economics was partly developed as an antidote against this bias, it was nevertheless inevitably affected by theorycentrism. Many experimental economists, for example, still see their business as being mainly concerned with theory testing. Of course there is nothing wrong with testing theories:
focusing on sharply defined predictions that have been rigorously derived from a set of transparent postulates is indeed an advantage that other neighbor disciplines (such as psychology) lack. And yet, theory-centrism carries the risk of interpreting every experimental result as either a falsification or a confirmation of an existing model, while neglecting its relevance for other issues regarding which no formal, general economic theory is currently available. This is, in our view, happening with the DG. Most experimental work over the last decade seems to be concerned with answering one of the following questions: How seriously should one take the evidence of willingness to donate reported in early DG experiments? Is the phenomenon robust enough to warrant a revision of the standard theory? If so, can the evidence be explained by existing models of altruism or fairness?
The answer to the latter question is obviously not unrelated to the answer given to the first two questions. If the results of the DG are very volatile and sensitive to small variations in the experimental set-up, one may be tempted to conclude that the evidence is both too ephemeral to count as a falsification of the standard model, and too heterogeneous to be captured by models of altruistic or fairness preferences. Such models typically represent other-regarding motives as modifications of the self-interested utility function of standard economic theory. According to the self-interest model, each individual i acts so as to maximize her own utility U i (.), where the utility function varies over her own monetary payoffs π i only. It is relatively simple to "complicate" the utility function by adding factors other than self-interest; a concern for altruism for example can be represented in the context of a two-person interaction as
where α and β are free parameters to be determined empirically and may vary from person to person. A preference for fairness -intended as equality -may take the following form:
In other words: an individual who is averse to inequality loses an amount of utility that is proportional to the difference between her monetary gains and those of another player. There are various models of this kind, differing in detail but sharing this basic modeling strategy (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt 1999 , Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 , Charness and Rabin 2002 . The authors of such models are well aware that they are simplifying what is probably a very complex set of mechanisms, but nevertheless defend their models appealing to their simplicity and predictive power. Prediction, however, has proven to be their Achilles' heel.
In spite of their valiant attempts, the identification of robust parameters that can predict data across different environments has been problematic. The DG provides perhaps one of the most vivid examples of such difficulty: small variations in details that are not even represented in these models lead to huge variations in behavior. Overall, it seems unlikely that such models can explain what has been observed in DG experiments so far.
The origins of the Dictator's Game
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986) which is the main focus of their study. The DG is used in this seminal paper only as a means
"to obtain an indication of the prevalence of unenforced fairness" in the Ultimatum Game (Kahneman et al. 1986: 106) . In an Ultimatum Game a "proposer" offers a division of the cake that a "respondent" can accept or reject. When proposers offer more than a minimal amount, it is impossible to say whether this is because they care about the fairness of the allocation, or because they are playing strategically to anticipate possible rejections. 5 The observation of donations in a DG that mirrored closely the structure of the UG, but where the strategic element had been eliminated by design, enabled Kahneman et al. (1986) to conclude that a concern for fairness is likely to play some role also in the Ultimatum Game. Reciprocity, to put it differently, violates consequentialism, a key postulate of rational choice, and thus is anomalous for standard game theory. But this is not the point we want to make in this paper. 6 Our main point is that the von Neumann-Morgenstern method involves essentially the use of mini-DG's. The DG is "kosher" game theory, when used this way. In this sense, it should be used more, not less often, because it is the best access we have to the observation of preferences over "pure" distributions that are undistorted by nonconsequentialist (procedural) concerns.
Looking for norms
If our interpretation is correct, the DG was never supposed to be a design of independent interest, but rather a methodological tool for the investigation of non-standard preferences. It was not meant to become a "paradigmatic experiment" in the same sense as the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Ultimatum Game. And there are good reasons to believe that it cannot become an experimental set-up of that kind. In order to see why, it is necessary to ask what makes Ultimatum and Prisoner's Dilemma games so interesting and fruitful as loci of experimental investigation.
Prisoner's Dilemma and Ultimatum games allow the observation of social norms in action.
Cooperation and fair splits are effects of our compliance with social norms that prescribe such behavior in settings of a given kind. What kind of settings fall under the domain of a norm is, as we shall see, an important empirical question. But the key point is that such games have the capacity to elicit normative behavior from players, even in the highly abstract and purified settings that experimental economists typically implement. As Ken Binmore (1998, 1999) has argued, subjects bring inside the laboratory a whole set of experiences and social cues that help them coping with what is an otherwise unfamiliar and puzzling situation.
Anthropologists who have played such games with hunter-gatherers in Africa, Asia, and South America (Henrich et al. 2004 ) largely confirm this insight. The Orma, a group of pastoral-nomadic people living in Kenia, for instance do not fail to notice that the Public Goods game is structurally similar to the harambee -an institution used for fund-raising and other collective projects -and behave accordingly (Ensminger 2004 ).
Public Goods and Ultimatum Games elicit norms of this kind in virtue of their structure, and of the fact that games with such a structure are relatively common in many societies. 7 The same, however, cannot be said of the DG. The DG has a remarkably simple structureindeed too simple (we should perhaps say "poor") to elicit a specific norm. It is an unusual situation too, for in real life one rarely deals with "windfall money" to be shared with an anonymous stranger. It is important to stress both aspects: structure and familiarity. Subjects have to deal with windfall money and anonymous partners in Ultimatum Games too, but the structure of the UG is rich enough to focus their attention on power asymmetries, and thus elicit the fairness norms that apply in such circumstances. The DG in contrast is too "thin"
for that, and experimental subjects are left to puzzle over which behavior is deemed appropriate for a situation of that kind. what a fair outcome would be, 68% indicated the equal split, but 21% of the sample thought that keeping the whole sum was fair. Bicchieri (2006: 126) data fit the prediction of the selfish rationality model is that their design has triggered a powerful normative mechanism that invites people to behave in a self-interested manner.
In experiments that introduce information about effort and reward of the recipient (Ruffle 1998, Mittone and Ploner 2008 ) the level of sharing is increased, because different rules of conduct are triggered. In richer environments people have to deal with different normative cues, and their behavior is going to reflect a trade-off between norms pushing in different directions (as well as the very human tendency towards selfishness that is always at work, to some extent). Thus a "pure" DG can be mostly useful as a benchmark, a contrast case to measure the relative effect of introducing such cues. It is implausible to expect that it can elicit a strong effect that is robust across a variety of environments.
So why have economists focused on testing theories of non-standard preferences instead?
Partly, because they presently lack a theory of norms. And although norms are at the centre of much research in the social sciences, neighbor disciplines like sociology have consistently failed to provide simple but general formal models that can be tested in the laboratory. This, in our view, goes a long way towards explaining the misunderstandings and unrealistic expectations that have confused the debate on the DG. The theory-centered approach prompted many experimental economists to look at the DG as a source of data for theorytesting and theory-building. But in doing so they were looking at the wrong theories.
Theories of norms
There currently are three major theoretical approaches to the study of norms: the first one represents norms as unconditional rules of behaviour; the second one as rules that are conditional on a system of expectations; and the third one as joint commitments produced by team thinking. In this section we review them briefly and assess their explanatory potential.
(1) Unconditional rules: the most popular approach in economics and the social sciences is to model social norms as Kantian imperatives of the form "in C, do S", where C is a set of relevant conditions and S is an available strategy (in game-theoretic sense). Thus, for example, a norm of cooperation would prescribe to cooperate unconditionally in every situation that has the structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma or a Public Goods game. This concept of norm has the advantage of being easy to model in mathematical terms: one may represent individuals as "dumb" agents who mechanically play the same strategy (as in evolutionary game theory), or alternatively add an other-regarding element in their utility function (as in models of fair preferences). The problem, however, is that all models of this kind are "born refuted": we know for example that unconditional cooperation explains only a minority data in Public Goods games (Burlando and Guala 2005, Gachter and Thoni 2005) , and that subjects behave quite differently depending on whether the other players expect them to be fair or not. In games where the payoffs are expressed in "chips" with different monetary values to each player, for example, subjects are quite happy to simply pretend to be fair (by sharing the chips, but not the money, equally) if the other players do not know how much the chips are worth (Kagel et al. 1996) .
(2) Conditional rules: the main alternative to the Kantian view is to model norms as conditional rules of behavior, of the form "in C, do S if X is the case". Theorists disagree regarding the nature of X: according to an approach that has gained some prominence in economics, individuals condition their behavior on the intentions of other players. Thus, for example, they are ready to cooperate if others also cooperate in PD games (respond "nice" to "nice"), but reject unequal offers in the UG (respond "nasty" to "nasty"). The main advantage of this approach is that it is consistent with a large body of literature emphasizing the importance of reciprocity both in biological and in cultural evolution (e.g. Trivers 1971 , Gintis et al. 2005 . Its main shortcoming is that "psychological games" with players who care about intentions are difficult to model and have a large number of equilibria (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2003, Falk and Fischbacher 2006) . Alternatively, some theorists (Pettit 1990 , Bicchieri 2006 economics, and philosophy, that emphasizes the importance of group identity for social behavior and the emergence of institutions (e.g. Tajfel and Turner 1986 , Sugden 2000 , Bacharach 2006 , Gilbert 1989 , Searle 1990 ). Institutions such as conventions and norms, according to this approach, result from a joint commitment by the members of a group to pursue collective rather than individual goals. Such commitments are normative roughly in the sense that a social contract is: they are mutually binding and cannot be breached unilaterally by individual members of the group. The main difference between this approach and the previous alternatives is that no individual reasoning is supposed to take place (of the form "If the other player does/believes X, I prefer to do S", etc.) and action is explained instead by desires and beliefs in "we-mode" ("we ought to do S in C").
Thick and thin designs
Research on norms -what they are and how they function -is only beginning to take off. To the extent that social norms influence economic behavior both within and outside market exchange, economists obviously have a stake in this research project. Experimental economists, moreover, have provided some important methodological tools that are now widely used across the human sciences -from social psychology, to anthropology, and evolutionary game theory. The final point we would like to make in this paper is that experimenters must now abandon some entrenched methodological habits and learn to adapt their experimental designs to the task at hand. If the key to explaining cooperation and fair allocation of resources lies in understanding social norms, it will be necessary to tailor the experiments accordingly. The days of testing the assumption of selfish rationality are gone.
We now know that behavior can both diverge and conform to the standard model, and we know that in different situations experimental subjects can be pushed towards one or the other extreme of the self-interested/other-regarding spectrum.
The classic precepts of experimental economics (Smith 1976 (Smith , 1982 , if strictly implemented, can be used to induce behavior that is very close to the predictions of the standard model. This is not surprising, because the precepts were first devised in the context of market experiments aimed at testing the effects of different institutional rules governing the exchange and allocation of goods. It was very important in the context of such experiments to achieve complete control on individual preference profiles, and abstract environments with strict anonymity conditions help a great deal in this respect. Over time, however, the precepts have been extended to decision-making and game theory experiments, where they are not always suited to the research goals. 9 In running such games experimenters are often interested in investigating the motivations that prompt subjects' behavior, rather than in controlling such motives as in market experiments.
Of course control is an important scientific goal in itself, and there may be situations in which economists are interested in finding ways to constrain agents' behavior in such a way as to make it conform more closely to the axioms of economic theory. (Consider an oligopolistic market, for instance: there may be very good reasons to make sure that certain forms of communication -and hence collusion -are forbidden in running an auction.) But it is important to keep in mind that the constraints are not going to be neutral with respect to the agents' interpretation of the game they are playing. Self-interested and competitive behavior, however common and perhaps even innate for humans, is regulated by a network of norms that can be triggered by various contextual cues. In the Hoffman et al. (1996) experiment reviewed in section 2, for instance, the double-anonymity design is likely to act like a trigger of this kind. Stressing in the experimental instructions that great care has been taken to make sure that absolutely nobody (not even the experimenter) will ever know what each subject has done, is not unlikely to point dictators towards one particular kind of behavior.
In this respect we find it useful to repeat George Loewenstein's (1999) reminder that every experimental context is a social context of some kind: even the most "purified" design, where every element of sociality has been removed by the experimenter, must be interpreted by the experimental subjects (as a game, as a competition, or simply as an experiment). And indeed, as we have seen, by removing every cue that may guide the players in forming normative expectations, we may end up with extremely fragile results that have little ecological validity.
Another important, related issue concerns the degree of ecology of experimental designs.
When a social (norm) driven behavior is analyzed is important to control how effective the experimental design is in activating the proper social norm. This is not only a matter of choosing the right payoffs or the right strategic interaction frame but is also a problem of choosing the correct stimuli. Economic experiments often use very artificial settings like presenting a matrix of numbers/payoffs. The claim is that such experimental designs are "clean": in other words, any uncontrollable factor induced by a specific set of stimuli -e.g. the effects produced by a specific scenario -is eliminated through the adoption of a totally artificial setting. There is extensive evidence however that stimuli of this kind activate specific areas of the brain which play only a limited role in social reasoning (see e.g. Sanfey et al. 2003 , Camerer et al. 2005 . Imagine that one is interested in analyzing the activation of a social norm which typically drives cooperation in small group interaction. In this kind of situations human beings are driven by a mix of selfish driven calculus and emotionally driven reactions. Designing the problem as if it were only a matter of computing the "best" payoff in a game theory setting can minimize the emotional part and thus generate a poor ecological result. Such designs are usually defended by pointing out that even in anodyne settings the effect of norms and emotions is strong enough to be detected by statistical means -the implication being that their effects must be even stronger in settings that are not biased towards triggering subjects' "calculative" attitudes. Once the very existence of norms is beyond dispute, however, this argument loses much of its appeal. Most experimental designs nowadays are devoted to investigating the factors that enhance or hinder the influence of norms. There is no guarantee that such factors exert the same effect in highly abstract as in socially richer designs. For this reason it is important that economists introduce more variation in designing the stimuli used in the experiments.
We do not find it useful, then, to insist that experiments be always performed in standardized environments with simple tasks, high monetary incentives, and repetition of the task. This is not equivalent "to use clean test tubes in chemistry experiments" (Binmore 1999: F17) -not, at least, if we are interested in studying norms and their effect on economic behavior. It is particularly surprising that such a piece of advice should come from an economist who has devoted much time and effort to studying social norms (Binmore 1998) . But again, the main focus of Binmore's research has been standard economic theory, and how to use it to explain normative behavior. It must be natural for him then to conceive of experimental economics as primarily aimed at theory testing rather than at the direct observation of the causes and effects of norms.
Conclusion
We hope that these remarks will help economists to appreciate the virtues and limitations of the DG in experimental research. We believe that our suggestions transcend the divide between behavioral and experimental, as well as heterodox and neoclassical economics. We have argued that much confusion and misunderstanding would be avoided by returning to the original methodology advocated by von Neumann and Morgenstern: DG's are particularly useful as tools for the observation of preferences and the estimation of utility functions in simple non-strategic contexts before we engage in testing the theory of rational play that is at the core of game theory. Moreover, the DG is likely to be useful as in studying the effect of contextual cues that determine the framing and triggering of social norms. As such, it will continue to be used by those economists who are willing to re-orient their research, away from the testing of preference theories, and towards theories of social norms.
